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LIFE INSURANCE—INSURABLE INTEREST AND THE FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT: WHY MEDICAID SETTLEMENT LEGISLATION
CRACKS THE FOUNDATION OF THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Heather Harris *
Life insurance products must be distinguishable from financial
instruments by including time-tested insurance safeguards.
Congress should exercise its authority under the McCarranFerguson Act to permit insurance providers to offer and
negotiate insurable interest as a contract term, and to price such
policies accordingly.
State law mandates that a life insurance policy owner must have
an insurable interest in the insured at the time of purchase.
This does not apply to the transfer of ownership after the policy
is in force. Life settlement companies purchase these policies
for approximately one-third of the death benefit, becoming the
owner and paying the remaining premiums. The company then
receives the full death benefit when the insured dies.
Recent state legislation permits policy forfeiture in exchange
for Medicaid benefits to the insured. The Medicaid applicant
forfeits the life insurance policy in exchange for Medicaid
qualification. Either the state or a third-party investor receives
the death benefit when the insured dies, who may not be the
policy owner.
Texas, Kentucky, Kansas, and Indiana have passed such
legislation, and other states are actively considering proposals.
At the time of contract formation, life insurers did not price
these policies to cover payouts encouraged by this legislation.
These financial losses will subsequently be passed to consumers,
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and jeopardize the future affordability of life insurance.

INTRODUCTION
I am a committed defender of insurable interest. I consider a
healthy concept of insurable interest to be essential to the
effective functioning of the life insurance industry, and I view the
mounting effort to erode that concept as the most dangerous
development to the industry of the last generation.1

In the fictional story The Hunger Games, people—humans—
are dropped into an arena to fight to the death.2 Outsiders watch
with substantial money at stake. The wagers are based on detailed
information about each human “Tribute”; details that predict how
much time each has left on this earth.
You abhor those who sent the humans to the arena for the
violence they create. The spectators disgust you; the distaste in
profiting from a human death stands independent of the distaste
for violence and it shocks the conscience almost more than the
violence itself. You are repulsed by them watching, that they are
rooting for someone’s demise. Strangers or not, there is something
inherently wrong about the desire for death, something intrinsically
menacing about profiting from a human passing. Wagering on
human life turns the stomach, and violates a universal moral code.
Gambling on human life continues to encroach on the life
insurance industry. Life insurance policies are sold to investors and
valued based on how quickly the investor expects death; the shorter
the life expectancy, the lower the financial risk, and the higher the
bid.3 As a gamble, the only loss is money. There is no sadness, no
mourning, no bereavement attached to the bet.
The distinguishing feature between a life insurance policy sold
to an investor and one retained by a loved one is the lack of
insurable interest. An insurable interest is a benefit from the

1. Telephone Interview with Stephen C. Baker, Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath
(Sep. 10, 2014). Mr. Baker is a nationally known litigator, specializing in the defense of
insurance companies in the secondary market of life insurance. Most notably for
purposes of this Note, Mr. Baker defended Lincoln Life & Annuity Company of New
York in the landmark case Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 N.E.2d 535 (N.Y.
2010). Biography, DRINKERBIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/people/attorneys/
baker-stephen-c [https://perma.cc/97GU-JASQ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
2. SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES (2008).
3. Seniors Beware: What You Should Know About Life Settlements,
FINRA.ORG,
http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/seniors-beware-what-you-shouldknow-about-life-settlements [https://perma.cc/8BPB-YKQ6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016)
[hereinafter Seniors Beware].
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“continued life of another.”4 According to the Supreme Court of
the United States, “[a] man cannot take out insurance on the life of
a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not so connected with
him as to make the continuance of the life a matter of some real
interest to him.”5
Insurable interest is often referenced by the Supreme Court,
which describes insurable interest as much by what the term
attempts to prevent, wager policies, as by what is included: a man’s
own life, a family member’s life and a creditor’s relationship with a
debtor.6 The insurable interest requirement is in the interest of
public policy.7 Without insurable interest, “the [life insurance]
contract does not have the same manifest utility and assumes more
speculative characteristics which may subject it to the same general
condemnation as wagers.”8 Insurance reduces risk, but wagers
assume risk9 and there is frankly “a sinister counter interest in
having the life come to an end.”10
In 1911, the Supreme Court held in Grigsby v. Russell that the
insurable interest requirement of a life insurance contract11 does
not extend to the assignment of the policy once in force.12
Therefore, after policy inception, the owner is free to assign13 it to
someone without an insurable interest.14 Over the past century,
this decision has turned the life insurance industry into an arena for
investing and wagering on the lives of others.
The terrain now has a new player—states. In 2013, Texas
became the first state to enact a life settlement program to fund

4. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).
5. Id.
6. Id.; Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1911) (“The very meaning of an
insurable interest is an interest in having the life continue” and so “wagers came to be
regarded as a mischievous kind of gaming.”).
7. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779
(1881) (reinforcing that wager policies are, “independently of any statute on the
subject, condemned, as being against public policy.”).
8. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 73 N.Y.2d 74, 78 (1989).
9. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (“Historically and commonly
insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing.”).
10. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 154.
11. At its root, a life insurance policy is a contract, and will be referred to as such
when discussing the policy in the context of contract law. Grigsby, 222 U.S. 149, 155
(“[There is n]o question as to the character of that contract . . . before us.”).
12. Id. at 149.
13. To consummate the sale of a life insurance policy, the rights of the policy are
assigned to the purchaser. Id. at 149.
14. Id. at 157.
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Medicaid;15 other states are following suit.16 States are diligently
forming groups to study the financial impact of legislation, but the
interests of insurers are mostly absent in these studies.17
A life settlement is the sale of a life insurance policy for
value.18 The life settlement market thwarts the basic tenet and
purpose of life insurance—insurable interest.19 “[L]ife insurance
has become a major, if not the major, factor in the concern of men
generally for the protection of their families and dependents.”20
The threat to the purpose, affordability, and sustainability of life
insurance has escalated with the entrance of states in the life
settlement market.21 Congress should reestablish the role of
insurable interest and, in response to current conditions, allow
insurers the freedom to contract, thereby clarifying Grigsby, which
is currently interpreted as enforcing a right to sell a life insurance
policy, rather than enforcing a contract under its terms and
applicable law.22
In order to allow insurers to respond to the new state
legislation, Congress should enact federal legislation to permit
insurers to offer and negotiate insurable interest as a contract term,
and to price such policies accordingly. Allowing the life insurance
industry to distinguish itself from the life settlement market will

15. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015).
16. E.g., IND. CODE § 12-15-121.7 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2015);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631 (West 2014).
17. E.g., COMM’N TO STUDY LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES, FINAL REP., S. 126,
1st Sess., (Me. 2013), http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/LTC2013reportpart1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YRP-GWJ8].
18. What is a Life Settlement?, LIFE INS. SETTLEMENT ASS’N
http://www.lisa.org/content/13/What-is-a-Life-Settlement.aspx [https://perma.cc/G74S4Y9Q] (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1111A.002 (West 2011)
(defining a life settlement contract as “a written agreement entered into between a
provider and an owner establishing the terms under which compensation . . . will be
paid . . . in return for the owner’s assignment, transfer, sale, devise, or bequest of the
death benefit.”).
19. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (“That life insurance is
desirable from an economic and social standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk
of loss from premature death is unquestionable.”).
20. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 171 F.2d 982, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
21. Wm. Scott Page, Texas Medicaid Law Could Transform Life Insurance
Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/wm-scott-page/texas-medicaid-law-could_b_3837442.html
[https://perma.cc/3D4X-AVK7].
(“The ramifications [of this legislation to life
insurance companies] are enormous to say the least.”).
22. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 157 (1911). The Court looked to the terms
of the life insurance contract at issue, and “with no rule of law” requiring insurable
interest, permitted the assignment. Id.
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ensure the future viability of life insurance for the benefit of those
who need it most.23 Once federally authorized, insurers could offer
two distinct life insurance policies: one with free assignability
regardless of insurable interest at a higher premium, and one that is
only assignable with insurable interest at the time of future sale at a
reduced premium. Under this proposal, the insurance industry
would bifurcate between the insurance product meant to financially
protect those left behind after death—the classic life insurance
product24—and a financial tool that enriches a stranger at the
insured’s death.25
This Note will trace the history of insurable interest beginning
in England and continuing to its reception into the common law of
the United States. It will then examine the Supreme Court’s early
perspective of insurable interest and the impact of these
fundamental high-court decisions on the establishment of the
secondary market. Next, this Note will compare the relationship
that states have with insurable interest, and how states handle
permutations of the secondary market.
Finally, this Note will argue that the most recent development
in the evolution of insurable interest—i.e. states passing Medicaid
settlement legislation in an attempt to defray state-funded
healthcare costs for their respective residents—is contrary to the
long-held support of insurable interest, and is dangerous to the
solvency of the life insurance industry. This Note concludes with a
federal call to action; a proposal to split the life insurance market
from the life settlement market and allow the resulting insuranceproduct markets to determine the sustainability of the life
settlement market when it cannot rely on insurance industry
subsidization.

23. A growing life settlement market threatens the life insurance industry. See
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE 20 (2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/lifesettlements-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AH5F-VRSQ] (“While life settlements may impact insurer’s
profitability and financial condition[s] . . . the extent of this impact is likely to be small
[due to] the very small percentage of [life insurance] policies that have been settled.”).
24. Id. at V. (“[T]he historical social policy of insurance . . . is to protect
families . . . from potential economic hardship caused by untimely death of the
insured.”) Id.
25. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1111A.002 (West 2011).

182

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

I.
A.

[Vol. 38:177

INSURABLE INTEREST

Across the Ocean: The Birth of Insurable Interest

Wager policies were outlawed in England by the Life
Assurance Act of 177426 and this prohibition was integrated into
the common law in the United States.27 “[T]he concept [of
insurable interest] is embedded”28 in The Life Assurance Act of
1774 as a means to prevent wager policies.29 This requirement of
insurable interest in a life insurance contract was in response to
historic wager policies that ended in the death of the insured.30 In a
wager, the beneficiary of life insurance has “no interest whatever”31
in the insured remaining alive, yet does have an interest in the
insured’s death in the amount of the death benefit.32 The dangers
inherent in such fundamental conflicts of interest violate public
policy.33
B.

Insurable Interest Historically in the United States

As insurable interest “became firmly rooted in the common
law of every state in the Union . . .”34 the Supreme Court explored
the lines that separated wager policies from those with insurable
interest, defining and updating the concept along the way.35 In
1876 the Supreme Court in Schaefer defined a wager policy as one
in which the policy owner has “no interest whatever in the matter
insured, but only an interest in its loss or destruction.”36 A wife
purchased life insurance on her husband, but subsequent to the

26. Life Assurance Act, 14 Geo. 3 (1774) (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
apgb/Geo3/14/48/section/1 [https://perma.cc/MK52-XGHY].
27. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).
28. PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust ex rel. Christiana Bank
& Trust Co., 28 A.3d 1059, 1069 (Del. 2011).
29. Id. (“Parliament enacted the Life Assurance Act of 1774 which prohibited
the use of insurance as a wagering contract unlinked to a demonstrated economic
risk.”).
30. Id.
31. Campbell v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381, 386 (1867).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Bland. (1865) 150 Eng. Rep. 334, https://archive.org/
details/casesonlawofinsu00vanc
[https://perma.cc/R49G-HVBG]
(depicting
Wainwright, an incorrigible criminal who poisoned Helen Abercromby with the
deliberate purpose of obtaining the insurance money).
34. PHL Variable Ins. Co., 28 A.3d at 1069.
35. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876); Warnock v.
Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881); Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
36. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460.
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purchase, the marriage ended and later still, the insured died.37 No
assignment took place. The purpose of life insurance, in the eyes of
the Court, was the “well-grounded expectations of support” that
would otherwise cease with the death of the insured.38 Therefore,
absent post-marital support obligations, the ex-wife no longer had
an insurable interest in her former husband.39 However, the Court
held that the policy was not void for the former wife’s cessation of
insurable interest.40 Citing English cases after the Life Assurance
Act of 1774, the Court stated that while there must be an insurable
interest at the effective date of life insurance, “it need not continue
until death” and therefore, this was not a wager policy.41
Five years later the Supreme Court in Warnock again
examined the insurable interest requirement after policy issuance.42
This time, the policy owner sold the interest in a life insurance
policy to a trust association with no insurable interest.43 Here, the
Court defined insurable interest as “a reasonable ground, founded
upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or
of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the
continuance of the life of the assured.”44 Without insurable
interest, the policy becomes a wager because the owner “is
interested in the death rather than the life of the party assured.
The law ought to be, and we think it clearly is, opposed to such
speculations in human life.”45
The Court limited the trust
association’s benefit to the amount the association had paid in
premiums, with interest.46
The Court’s remedy was similar to a collateral assignment. In
a collateral assignment, there is a creditor-debtor relationship and
therefore insurable interest because the creditor has an interest in
the debtor surviving and paying the debt.47 If the debtor dies
before satisfying the debt, the creditor is entitled to the death
benefit up to the amount of the existing debt.48 Therefore, the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 457.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. In other words, there is no underlying legal or moral obligation.
Id.
Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881).
Id.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 781.
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).
Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659, 662 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Unlike an
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creditor is made whole, but does not profit from the debtor’s
death.49
Warnock is valuable because the Court clarified that the
insurable interest requirement extended beyond the inception of
the policy.50 The reason for requiring insurable interest at the
purchase of the policy extends to assignment: “the same ground
which invalidates the one should invalidate the other.”51 However,
thirty years later the Supreme Court again addressed the issue.52
In 1911, the Supreme Court established the authority cited by
the life settlement market as the basis for its very existence,
Grigsby v. Russell.53 In this seminal case, Mr. Burchard needed
money for surgery.54 As a way to fund the operation, Mr. Burchard
sold his life insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby for one hundred
dollars, and assigned the life insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby.55 Mr.
Burchard’s death (about one year later)56 was unrelated to the
surgery.57
The Court reasoned that the sale between Mr. Burchard and
Dr. Grigsby was “very different from granting such a general
license, to allow [Mr. Burchard] to transfer it to one whom he, the
party most concerned, is not afraid to trust.”58 This scenario lacked
the “mischievous kind of gaming” objectionable since early English
cases.59 The Court in Grigsby distinguished itself from its holding
in Warnock by stating that the policy in Warnock was purchased

absolute assignment, which permanently transfers all rights in the policy to the
assignee, a collateral assignment transfers only those rights necessary to secure the
assignor’s debt.”).
49. Id.
50. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779 (“The assignment of a policy to a party not having
an insurable interest is as objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his name.”).
51. Id. at 782.
52. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
53. Id.;
see
Life
Settlement
Questions,
POLICY
SETTLEMENT,
http://policysettlement.com/q-and-a/ [https://perma.cc/J5EF-UNRK] (last visited Feb.
22, 2016) (“Life settlements were legalized in The United States in 1911 by [the]
Supreme Court Decision [Grigsby v. Russell].”); see also History of Life Settlements in
the U.S., LIFE INS. SETTLEMENT ASS’N, http://www.lisa.org/content/51/life-settlementhistory.aspx [https://perma.cc/T844-SRRL] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“The legal basis
for life settlements as a legitimate option for life insurance owners may be found in the
Grigsby v. Russell decision from the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
54. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 154.
55. Id.
56. History of Life Settlements in the U.S., supra note 53.
57. Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1909) rev’d, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
58. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911).
59. Id. at 156.
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for the purpose of assignment.60 However, a dying patient in need
of surgery may have played on the Grigsby Court’s sympathy
causing it to grasp for a non-existent distinction because the
Warnock Court made no such distinction.61 Grigsby discussed the
property rights often associated with life insurance policies, as well
as the economic risk to the value of life insurance as an asset if
these property rights were not upheld.62 And thus came the
secondary market for life insurance.
II. THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE
Despite the common law rule against wager policies, the
practice of wagering still exists, continuously morphing in an
attempt to overcome statutory or common law hurdles.63 Today
the life settlement industry and its permutations are taking the
place of common law wager policies.64 A life settlement is the sale
of a life insurance policy for value.65 The life settlement market has
evolved from viatical settlements, to stranger originated life
insurance, and most recently, to state enactment of Medicaid
settlement legislation.66
A. The Evolution of Insurable Interest in the United States:
60. Id.
61. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 782 (1881) (“The same ground which
invalidates the one [a policy at issuance] should invalidate the other [a subsequent
assignment]—so far, at least, as to restrict the right of the assignee to the sums actually
advanced by him.”).
62. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156.
63. See Allison Schrager, Investing in Other People’s Life Insurance Makes a
Comeback, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-07-30/life-settlements-investors-interest-in-life-insurance-grows
[https://perma.cc/6NCL-XFUV] (“Life settlements were born of the related practice of
buying the life insurance policies of those who are terminally ill,” i.e., effecting viatical
settlements.); see also Michael G. Koutnik, Comment, Long Live Life Settlements: The
Current Status and Proposed Direction of the Life Settlement Market, 96 MARQ. L.
REV. 913, 926 (2013) (Following viatical settlements, another “market, this time
fraudulent, grew from the life settlement market: the STOLI policy market.”).
64. See Seniors Beware, supra note 3 (“When you sell your life insurance policy,
whoever buys it is acquiring a financial interest in your death.”).
65. What is a Life Settlement?, supra note 18.
66. There are other forms of settlement in related industries, such as stranger
originated annuity policies. Memorandum from the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’r to All
Insurers
Selling
Life
Ins.
or
Annuities
in
the
U.S.
(2011),
http://www.naic.org/documents/legal_bulletin_111018_stoa.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5F8NH9T]; Elizabeth D. Festa, NAIC Issues Bulletin Against Stranger-Originated
Annuities, LIFEHEALTHPRO (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/10/12/
naic-issues-bulletin-against-stranger-originated-a
[https://perma.cc/TKE8-FTLM].
Though there are many parallel concerns, these are beyond the scope of this Note.
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Viatical Settlements
Modern life settlements originated in the 1980’s as viatical
settlements in response to the AIDS crisis.67 A terminally ill
person could sell an existing life insurance policy to a third-party
that lacked an insurable interest in her life.68 The investor paid the
insured a lump sum in exchange for assignment of owner and
beneficiary.69 As treatment for AIDS improved, this market
opened beyond the terminally ill and life settlement companies
targeted seniors with Stranger Originated Life Insurance
(“STOLI”).70
B. Stranger Originated Life Insurance71
In a STOLI sale an investor solicits an elderly prospect and
invites her to purchase a life insurance policy.72 The investor pays
the premiums, and after the contestability period,73 the owner
transfers ownership to this investor.74 The investor pays a fee to
the owner following the assignment,75 and the owner gets free life

Schrager, supra note 63.
James Vlahos, Are You Worth More Dead Than Alive?, N.Y. TIMES:
SUNDAY MAGAZINE (Aug. 10, 2012), at MM30, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/
magazine/are-you-worth-more-dead-than-alive.html.
69. Id.
70. Schrager, supra note 63.
71. Larry King, the well-known former talk show host, is one of the most
prominent STOLI victims. Anita Huslin, Wealthy Engage in Controversial Re-selling
of
Life
Insurance
Policies,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
27,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/26/AR2007112602182
.html. At the recommendation of his broker, King purchased $15 million in life
insurance. Id. He then sold the policies for $1.4 million. Liam Pleven & Rachel Emma
Silverman, An Insurance Man Builds a Lively Business in Death, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26,
2007, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB119604142916903531. King alleged
that his broker did not review the tax implications of the transaction or the impact it
would have on purchasing life insurance in the future, and was unhappy that he did not
know the identity of those who would benefit from his death. Huslin, supra. He settled
the dispute in 2008 without disclosing the terms. Mike Myers, Larry King Settles Life
Insurance Suit, CONTINGENT FEE BUSINESS LITIGATION (Sept. 2, 2008),
http://www.contingentfeeblog.com/2008/09/articles/life-insurance-1/larry-king-settleslife-insurance-suit/ [https://perma.cc/4MYN-YDYH].
72. Mary Ann Mancini & Caitlin L. Murphy, The Elusive Insurable Interest
Requirement: Are You Sure the Insured Is Insured?, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J.
409, 439 (2012).
73. The contestability period is usually two years. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 58-15-10 (2014) (After two years the policy is “incontestable, except for
nonpayment of premiums or fraud on the part of the applicant or insured . . . .”).
74. Mancini & Murphy, supra note 72.
75. Id.
67.
68.
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insurance during the contestability period.76 While Grigsby is cited
to authorize the life settlement market,77 by distinguishing
Warnock, the Court explicitly denounced the STOLI market
subset, taken out “for the purpose” of a stranger owning the policy
where “a person having an interest lends himself to one without
any, as a cloak to what is, in its inception, a wager . . . .”78
Life insurance policies have a limited contestability period, but
in some states, fraud may be alleged outside the period.79 When
STOLI is litigated as the fraudulent purchase of a life insurance
policy, an insurer must prove the intent of the purchaser at the
inception of the contract.80 The life insurance policy is “lawful only
if . . . purchase[d] . . . with a good-faith intent to obtain insurance
for the benefit of his family, loved one, or business; they are not
lawful if . . . purchase[d] . . . with the intent to resell it to a stranger
at the earliest possible moment.”81 Importantly, because litigation
occurs after the third-party reports a death claim, it is often the
deceased party whose intent is at issue.82
C. State Action in STOLI
In response to the negative effects of STOLI on consumers,
many states have enacted legislation based on a hybrid of two
model laws.
First, the National Conference of Insurance
Legislators (“NCOIL”) proposed a model in 200783 with a waiting
period of two years84 between the purchase of a life insurance
76. Vlahos, supra note 68; see generally Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940
N.E.2d 535 (N.Y. 2010).
77. Whether Grigsby truly authorizes the life settlement market, or merely does
not prohibit it will be discussed later in this Note. See infra Part V.C.
78. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911).
79. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-10 (2014) (After two years the policy “is
incontestable, except for nonpayment of premiums or fraud on the part of the applicant
or insured . . . .”). But see Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 682 N.E.2d 624, 625
(Mass. 1997) (holding that “insurer could not rescind policy for fraud after passage of
two-year statutory contestability period”).
80. Life Prod. Clearing, LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
81. Id.
82. Until the obligations under the policy become due, the issue is not ripe for
judicial review. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Mosier v. Phoenix Life Ins.
Co., 8:12-cv-00227-PSG-E (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (“[I]n so far as the Receiver’s
claims are based on the assertion the [sic] Phoenix [the insurer] plans to deny coverage
under the Policies if and when they become due, absent an unequivocal statement by
Phoenix to this effect, such allegations are not ripe for review.”).
83. NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS.
LEGISLATORS 2007), http://www.insurereinsure.com/files/upload/2005368I.pdf.
84. This time period matches the contestability period in most states. See, e.g.,
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-10 (2014). However, the contestability period refers to
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policy and when it may be sold to a party lacking insurable
interest;85 the model explicitly defines and prohibits STOLI.86
Second, in 2009, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (“NAIC”) proposed its own model act that
expands the waiting period on life settlements to five years87 but
lacks recourse for premium financing, one of the techniques to fund
STOLI.88 Many state laws reflect these models,89 actively working
to prevent STOLI because it is dangerous to allow investments that
thwart the purpose of purchasing life insurance.90 New York and
California are examples of states that did not adopt either model.
In New York,91 the intent of the original purchaser of a life
insurance policy does not matter, as decided in Kramer v. Phoenix
Life Insurance Company.92 The New York Court of Appeals held
that New York law incorporates the common law understanding
that a policy “valid at the time of procurement” may be assigned to
a party not having an insurable interest, as long as the policy was
“‘valid in its inception.’”93 The decision to purchase the life
the time period when an insurer may challenge the contract (for a reason besides fraud
or unpaid premiums). The waiting period in this NCOIL model prevents an owner
from selling the policy during that time. NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. LEGISLATORS 2007), http://www.insurereinsure.com/
files/upload/2005368I.pdf. Although the time periods align, the two laws address two
unique issues.
85. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 223A (2014). Massachusetts has
adopted the NCOIL model, requiring a two-year waiting period for settlement
following issuance, with certain exceptions. Id.
86. NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS.
LEGISLATORS 2007), http://www.insurereinsure.com/files/upload/2005368I.pdf.
87. NAIC VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(a) (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 2009), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-697.pdf.
88. Id. Premium financing is an arrangement where the premium is paid as a
loan, and the life insurance policy itself serves as collateral for the loan. It is an
indicator of STOLI, but there are legitimate premium finance arrangements. U.S. SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 11.
89. See Mary Jo Hudson, Baily Cavalieri LLC, Life Settlements & STOLI A
Case
Law
Update,
Presentation
at
the
NAIC
CLE
15
(2013),
http://baileycavalieri.com/165-Life%20Settlements%20and%20STOLI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P5M8-P8E8]. As of 2013 nine states had a five year waiting period,
one state had a four year waiting period, and twenty one states had a two year waiting
period before a life insurance policy may be sold. The other nineteen states did not
incorporate either model into their insurable interest laws. Id.
90. NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS.
LEGISLATORS 2007) 1, http://www.insurereinsure.com/files/upload/2005368I.pdf.
91. Similar to New York, New Jersey does not prohibit STOLI. Donna
Horowitz, 2013 saw end of market’s decline, THE DEAL PIPELINE (June 19, 2014),
(Special
Report)
at
1,
http://www.thedeal.com/pdf/2013LSSpecialReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KZL7-BGK5].
92. 940 N.E.2d 535, 536–537 (N.Y. 2010).
93. Id. at 541.
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insurance policy must be “free from nefarious influence or
coercion,” but, absent this, the intent to immediately sell the policy
after purchase is irrelevant.94 While reaching a decision so contrary
to the majority of states, the court recognized that there is “tension
between the law’s distaste for wager policies” and the court’s
holding, but reiterates that this “is not [the court’s] role” as it
simply interprets the law.95 The court found that New York law
does not prevent STOLI if the purchaser had an insurable interest
at that moment, regardless of an intent to sell.96
California’s law is a stark contrast to New York’s. California
recognized that its insurable interest law could not combat STOLI
as it evolved, despite the best attempts of insurers.97 Investors
create new ways to skirt the law: for example, purchasers would
create a “shell third-party entity”—like a trust—to mask STOLI
and allow truthful responses on the life insurance application
meant to prevent STOLI.98 In response to STOLI’s persistence,
California law now addresses the issue of the straw man,99 stating
that “[a]ny device, scheme, or artifice designed to give the
appearance of an insurable interest where there is no legitimate
insurable interest violates the insurable interest laws.”100
D. The “Legitimate” Secondary Market for Life Insurance: Life
Settlements
Though STOLI is illegal in most states, it is merely a subset of
a much larger life settlement market.101 While most states have
94. Id.
95. Id. at 542.
96. Id. (“It is not our role, however, to engraft an intent or good faith
requirement onto a statute that so manifestly permits an insured to immediately and
freely assign such a policy.”).
97. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Gordon R.A. Fishman Irrevocable Life Trust,
638 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (Cal. 2009) (“[T]he [California] law as it presently exists
allows this kind of insurance arrangement to be valid. . . . [I]t is perhaps best to follow
the wisdom expressed long ago by President Ulysses S. Grant, who said that ‘the best
way to get rid of a bad law is to enforce it.’”).
98. Am. Gen. Life Ins. v. Goldstein, 741 F. Supp. 2d 604, 608 (D. Del. 2010) (“In
order to conceal the nature of [STOLI] policies, the insured individual will often
designate the policyholder and/or beneficiary of the proceeds to be a shell third-party
entity such as a trust, and then transfer the beneficiary interest [in the trust, rather than
the life insurance policy] to a STOLI entity after obtaining the policy.”). This way,
there is no beneficiary change through the insurer to raise suspicions. Id.
99. CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1 (West 2010).
100. Id.
101. JOSEPH E. LASKA, THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN STOLI AND OTHER
SCHEMES 53 (2012), http://online.fliphtml5.com/gxrx/hmch/#p=1 [https://perma.cc/
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enacted legislation to prevent STOLI (i.e. life insurance originated
by, and purchased on behalf of, a stranger, third-party investor),
this state action is not meant to eliminate life settlement
transactions as a whole.102 It is legal to sell a life insurance policy
that was purchased in good faith and with insurable interest.103
1.

The Life Settlement Market by the Numbers

There are two payouts in a life settlement. First, the investor
pays the current owner a settlement price at the time of settlement,
i.e., assignment.104 Second, the new owner as beneficiary collects
the death benefit at the insured’s death.105 The policy’s face value
along with other factors, such as the insured’s age, medical history,
and life expectancy, determine the settlement price.106
The life settlement market is a small fraction of the whole life
insurance industry. The aggregate face value of life insurance in
the United States in 2010 was $18 trillion.107 By comparison, in
2014 the aggregate face value of policies in the life settlement
market totaled only $32 billion.108 The life insurance industry wrote
$130 billion in new premiums in 2012.109 In 2013 only $2.57 billion
(in face value) of life insurance policies were sold in the secondary
842Q-6TPE] (“Currently 39 states have either banned STOLI or have introduced
legislation to do so.”).
102. CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1 (West 2010) (While an “insurable interest
shall . . . exist at the time the contract of life . . . insurance becomes effective, [it] need
not exist at the time the loss occurs.”).
103. See Life Settlement Questions, supra note 53.
104. Pleven & Silverman, supra note 71.
105. Id.
106. Seniors Beware, supra note 3 (“When you sell your life insurance policy,
whoever buys it is acquiring a financial interest in your death.”). It is, thus, a legal
forum to wager on another person’s life (where the person has already validly procured
life insurance and is now willing to sell such coverage). James Vlahos, Are You Worth
More Dead Than Alive?, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY MAGAZINE (Aug. 10, 2012), at MM30,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/magazine/are-you-worth-more-dead-thanalive.html. (“For all the advancements that aim to make life-expectancy science more
precise, death remains one of the most uncertain certainties around. When you invest
in an individual life settlement, you are placing a bet.”).
107. EY, CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY TO THE US
ECONOMY 3 (2014), https://www.acli.com/Issues/Taxes/Documents/EY_ACLI-LifeInsurance-Industry-Contributions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UMU-ZR7U].
108. Press Release, Conning, Life Settlements and Secondary Market Annuities:
Opportunities and Challenges (Oct. 14, 2015) https://www.conning.com/pressreleasedetail.aspx?id=12916 [https://perma.cc/BN9L-KEMY].
109. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT ON
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 14 (June 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/
reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20Annual%20Report%202013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2F38-79XW].
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market.110 Fifteen life settlement companies dominate the industry,
controlling almost 87% of the market and generating 1,281
settlements in 2013.111 These policies had a face value of $2.23
billion and settled for $362 million, an average settlement payout of
16.2%.112
Even though the life settlement market is small in proportion
to the life insurance industry, it is growing.113 The life settlement
market grew by over 20% from 2012 to 2013,114 and is estimated to
grow from $35 billion in 2013115 to $150 billion within ten years.116
2.

Lapse Rates in the Life Insurance Industry

Not all life insurance policies are in force at the time of the
insurable event—the insured’s death—a significant number lapse.117
This is a factor for life insurance companies in setting policy
premiums.118 General life insurance lapse rates are reported at
85%,119 or even 88%, though not disclosed by insurance
companies.120 The lapse rate for the population targeted by the life
settlement industry, those over sixty-five years old, is near 35%.121
3.

State Regulation of Life Settlements

Some state laws regulate contact between the owner of the life

110. Horowitz, supra note 91, at 1.
111. Id. at 4. The fifteen top life settlement companies in 2013 include the
following: Coventry First, Magna Life Settlements Inc., Settlement Group Inc., Life
Equity LLC, Abacus Settlements LLC, Legacy Benefits LLC, Berkshire Settlements
Inc., CMG Life Services, FairMarket Life Settlements Corp., Institutional Life Services
LLC, GWG Life Settlements, Habersham Funding LLC, Maple Life Financial Inc.,
RiverRock Partners LLC, Montage Financial Group Inc. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Laura Davison, Pay for Death-Bet Middlemen Fuels Risk, Conning Says,
BUS. WK. (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:51 PM) http://swissinfo.ch/eng/compensation-for-death-betmiddlemen-fuels-risk--conning-says/40806762 [https://perma.cc/96NB-LFVC].
116. Huslin, supra note 71.
117. DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP & THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, THE
LIFE SETTLEMENTS MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONSUMER
ECONOMIC VALUE 12 (2005), http://www.quatloos.com/uconn_deloitte_life_
settlements.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM2L-Z5HE].
118. Id.
119. See Huslin, supra note 71.
120. DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, supra note 117, at 12.
121. Id. Perhaps as people age, mortality is easier to accept and the value of the
death benefit significantly outweighs the premiums due. In addition, the longer a
person has owned a life insurance policy, the more they have invested in it.
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insurance and the insured.122 For example, the owner-investor may
only contact a healthy insured once every three months to verify
her health status—if she is still living, but may contact an unhealthy
insured, someone with a life expectancy of less than one year, once
every thirty days.123 States also regulate the disclosures required
prior to the life settlement—a free-look provision,124 and privacy
requirements regarding the medical information are submitted to
determine the value of the policy.125
4.

Tax: the Transfer for Value Rule

While many states regulate the practice of a life settlement
transaction, it is the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) that
regulates the proceeds.126 The IRS treats the proceeds of a life
settlement differently than the death benefit of a policy.127 Life
insurance, the “favored child of the Internal Revenue Code,”128 has
unique tax privileges.129 Generally, a life insurance death benefit is
not taxed as gross income under the Internal Revenue Code
(“Code”).130 One exception to this special treatment is a life
insurance policy that is transferred for valuable consideration.131
Under the transfer for value rule, a death benefit paid in a life
settlement exceeding the consideration and premiums paid for the

122. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 220
(2015); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7811 (McKinney 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 744.364 (2014);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-36-109 (West 2015).
123. OR. REV. STAT. § 744.364 (2015). The owner-investor may be tempted to
have more frequent contact in order to file death claims as soon as possible and receive
the death benefit.
124. A free-look provision is a period of time, often ten days, in which a
purchaser of life insurance may renege the contract without penalty. See, e.g., S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-8.1 (2015).
[A person may] return the policy . . . within ten days [and] have the premium
paid refunded if, after examination of the policy, the purchaser is not
satisfied . . . for any reason . . . . [I]t is void from the beginning and the parties
are in the same position as if no policy had been issued.
Id.
125. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 220 (2015).
126. I.R.C. § 101 (2013).
127. Id.
128. Donald O. Jansen & Lawrence Brody, The Often Overlooked Income Tax
Rules of Life Insurance Policies, TAX’N PLAN. AND COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, Autumn
2013,
at
56,
http://www.willamette.com/insights_journal/13/autumn_2013_6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y65S-LYLP].
129. I.R.C. § 101 (2013).
130. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2013).
131. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2) (2013).
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assignment is taxable as gross income.132
There are two related exceptions to the taxation of life
insurance benefits. First, accelerated death benefits of a life
insurance policy are not taxed under the Code.133 An accelerated
death benefit is an additional, negotiable term of a life insurance
contract whereby the insured may receive a portion of the death
benefit early if she is terminally or chronically ill.134 Not all life
insurance policies carry this feature since it is an optional term of
the contract.
Second, the Code also makes an exception for viatical
settlements.135 A viatical settlement is the same as a life settlement,
except that the seller must be terminally or chronically ill to qualify
for the settlement.136 If a terminally or chronically ill person does
not have an accelerated death benefits rider on her policy, she may
still sell the policy to a qualified viatical settlement company.137
Under these circumstances, the IRS treats the amount paid to the
insured by the viatical settlement company as a death benefit, and
not taxed.138
These two exceptions to the transfer for value rule created
confusion about how to tax a life settlement. In response, the IRS
issued two revenue rulings in 2009.139 The first of these revenue
rulings demonstrated that in a life settlement, the amount realized
by the seller of the policy is income under the Code.140 The second
revenue ruling clarified that the profit incurred from a death
benefit following a transfer for valuable consideration is taxed as
gross income.141
With these clarifications, the IRS was
unambiguous that the life settlement market is not entitled to the
tax benefits of life insurance.142
132. Id.
133. I.R.C. § 101(g) (2013).
134. Id.
135. This exception was implemented with the passage of HIPAA in 1996. Gary
J. Gasper, New Tax-Free Treatment of Viatical Settlements, THE CPA J., May 1997.
136. Terminal illness is an illness with a life expectancy under twenty-four
months. NAIC Viatical Settlements Model Act, supra note 87, at 697–5. A chronic
illness is when the person is unable to perform two activities of daily living (specified in
the Act), requires substantial supervision, and has a level of disability comparable to
the definition provided by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. at 697–2.
137. Gasper, supra note 135.
138. I.R.C. § 101(g)(2)(A) (2013).
139. Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B.; Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B.
140. Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B (Situation 2).
141. Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B.
142. Jansen & Brody, supra note 128, at 56.
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The Life Settlement Market Abroad

The life settlement market attracts investors beyond the
United States.143 The United States is the largest secondary market
for life insurance, followed by Japan and the United Kingdom;144
Germany most recently joined the market in 1999.145
Although life settlements have been legal in the United
Kingdom since 1844,146 they are disfavored in the retail market by
financial regulators.147 In 2012 the Financial Services Authority
(“FSA”)148 called traded life policy investments (“TLPIs”)
“toxic.”149 The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”)150 calls them
“death bonds,” and explains that the insured’s are “typically . . . US
citizens.”151 These “schemes” are “high–risk,” additionally they are
“offshore and so outside of [its] regulatory scope.”152
Canadian law restricts trafficking life insurance policies.153 In

143. The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, BVZL INT’L SECONDARY
MKTS. FOR LIFE INS., http://www.bvzl.de/index.php?language=en&main_id=15&sub_id
=57 [https://perma.cc/H9GK-Z2P6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
144. The UK Secondary Market, BVZL INT’L SECONDARY MKTS. FOR LIFE
INS.,
http://www.bvzl.de/index.php?language=en&main_id=15&sub_id=59
[https://perma.cc/6LZL-K56G] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
145. The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. Traded life policy investments, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY,
http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-products/investments/types-ofinvestment/traded-life-policy-investments [https://perma.cc/2JNU-7XBM] (modified
Feb. 14, 2014).
148. This regulatory authority has since been split in two, the Financial Conduct
Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk
[https://perma.cc/BHV3-4PB9] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
149. Natalie Holt, Consumers Hit Out at FSA Over Life Settlements, MONEY
MARKETING (Aug. 16, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/consumershit-out-at-fsa-over-life-settlements/1056262.article [https://perma.cc/26AN-VTHL].
150. How We Operate, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, http://www.fca.org.uk/
about/governance [https://perma.cc/KN4P-MWLN] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (The
FCA is “accountable to the Treasury and, through them, to Parliament.”).
151. Id.; Traded life policy investments, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY,
http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-products/investments/types-ofinvestment/traded-life-policy-investments
[https://perma.cc/2JNU-7XBM]
(last
modified Feb. 14, 2014).
152. Traded life policy investments, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY,
http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-products/investments/types-ofinvestment/traded-life-policy-investments
[https://perma.cc/2JNU-7XBM]
(last
modified Feb. 14, 2014).
153. Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. I.8, § 115 (Can.) (“Any person . . . who
trafficks or trades in life insurance policies for the purpose of procuring the sale,
surrender, transfer, assignment, pledge or hypothecation thereof to himself, herself or
itself or any other person, is guilty of an offence.”).
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Ontario, however, the Financial Services Tribunal determined that
this restriction is limited to Canadian life insurance policies.154 And
thus, Canadian investors actively participate in the US life
settlement market.155
The US life settlement market is attractive to foreign investors
for many reasons. First, unlike the term156 and endowment157
products primarily offered to the secondary markets in the United
Kingdom and Germany, the US life settlement market is largely
made up of permanent policies158 (whole life and universal life).159
Second, in countries such as Canada, life settlements are largely
banned within the provinces, so investors cross the border to
participate.160 Third, if premiums are paid, there is a guaranteed
payout because death is a certainty—the only unknown is when.
Therefore, the life settlement market attracts investors beyond US
borders, but the lives being gambled on are largely those of US
citizens.

154. Trading in life insurance policies, FIN. POST, http://www.financialpost.com/
story.html?id=8a7866a1-f652-434a-a18d-1eb4c301b38e [https://perma.cc/7KT8-YXC5]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
155. Tara Perkins, Manulife unit battles U.S. ‘life settlements’ industry, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Aug. 23, 2012, 4:56 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globeinvestor/manulife-unit-battles-us-life-settlements-industry/article573948/
[https://perma.cc/8CCR-JUSY].
156. Term life insurance provides coverage for a certain period of time, normally
between one and thirty years.
Life Insurance Basics, INS. INFO. INST.,
http://www.iii.org/article/life-insurance-basics
[https://perma.cc/S7RH-7BH3]
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2016).
157. An endowment policy is an investment tool that also includes term life
insurance. If the insured dies during the term, a death benefit is paid. Amy Fontinelle,
The Pros Of An Endowment Life Insurance Policy, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/12/endowment_life_insurance.asp (last visited
Feb. 22, 2016).
158. Permanent life insurance remains in force until the insured’s death if all
premiums are paid. Life Insurance Basics, supra note 156.
159. The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, supra note 143. Both whole life
and universal life insurance is a type of permanent policy, but with universal life
insurance the premiums are more flexible. Life Insurance Basics, supra note 156. As
cash value accumulates in the policy, the policy owner has the option to reduce the
premium payments as long as the interest earned on the cash value is sufficient. Id.
160. Perkins, supra note 155.
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III. STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET:
MEDICAID SETTLEMENTS161
The US life settlement market has not only attracted global
players, but also the attention of state governments struggling to
reduce deficits.162 In 2013 Texas became the first state to enact
Medicaid settlement legislation, in which Medicaid candidates
could sell their life insurance policy to an investor and use the
settlement funds to finance long-term care.163 Medicaid normally
has a five-year look-back period where transfers of assets are
evaluated for qualification.164
Under Medicaid settlement
legislation, the policy that is subject to the settlement is not
considered an asset despite the transaction occurring within five
years of the application.165 In exchange for waiving the look-back,
this financing technique delays the implementation of tax-funded
Medicaid benefits for the candidate, saving the state significant
money.166 Other states are now following.167
Medicaid settlement legislation has two forms: the private
option and the public option.168 States such as Kentucky and Texas
adopted the private option, while other states such as Florida and
Louisiana propose making both options available.169 Kansas and

161. The term “Medicaid Settlements” is the phrase used by the American
Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) to describe the legislation discussed in this Note.
Presentation given by The Honorable Robert Damron, et al. on Medicaid Settlements
to the 2013 ACLI Annual Conference, 2 (Oct. 2013) (on file with author). Recognizing
the influence of the ACLI, and the likelihood that this phrase will be commonly used in
the future, this Note adopts the ACLI term.
162. E.g., ST. OF ME. FINAL REP. OF THE COMM’N TO STUDY LONG-TERM
CARE FACILITIES LEGIS. 126 (2013).
163. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015).
164. Glossary, LONGTERMCARE.GOV, http://longtermcare.gov/the-basics/
glossary/#Look_Back_Period (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
165. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015).
166. ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, at 4 (La. 2013)
http://www.ldi.la.gov/docs/default-source/documents/publicaffairs/annualreports/scr104.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/GR44-CD7M]; FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE
ADMIN., ACCELERATED LIFE BENEFITS TECHNICAL ADVISORY WORKGROUP 7 (Jan.
15,
2013)
http://www.lifecarefunding.com/pdfs/florida-medicaid-legislativereport.pdf?file=2013/1/Florida+Medicaid+Legislative+Report+and+Bill+Policy+Conve
rsions+to+Long+Term+Care+2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/BG6Q-7QP2] [hereinafter
“Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup”].
167. E.g., IND. CODE § 12-151-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2015);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631 (West 2014).
168. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 8.
169. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631 (West 2014); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §
32.02613 (West 2015); Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note
166, at 7; ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166.
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Indiana passed legislation for the public option.170 A New Jersey
bill creating the public option is currently pending after a similar
bill did not pass during the 2012–13 legislative session.171
A. The Medicaid Program
Medicaid is a joint state and federal program that “finances
health care for the poor.”172 However, with the cost of long-term
care, “[t]hose who have been solidly middle class or more for their
entire adult lives are forced to rely on Medicaid . . . .”173 The “gray
tsunami” of baby boomers are reaching the age where they may
need long-term care, and the Medicaid system cannot handle the
influx.174 States finance their portion through “permissible taxes”
and “legislative appropriations.”175
To qualify for Medicaid, a candidate must have limited assets
and income.176 Privately held life insurance policies can disqualify a
candidate for Medicaid coverage.177
As a result, Medicaid
candidates often forfeit life insurance in order to “spend down”
their assets.178 Medicaid settlement legislation proposes two
alternatives to the current forfeiture options.179
B. The Private Option
A Medicaid settlement through the private option is very
similar to a private life settlement as is currently practiced in the
secondary market.180 A Medicaid candidate finds a life settlement
170.
171.

IND. CODE § 12-15-2-17 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2015).
LA. DEP’T OF INS., HCR 210 OF THE 2014 REGULAR SESSION: USE OF
VIATICAL SETTLEMENT FOR LONG-TERM CARE OF MEDICAID APPLICANTS 3–4
(2014), http://www.ldi.louisiana.gov/docs/default-source/documents/legaldocs/hcr-21014.pdf?sfvrsn=10 [https://perma.cc/P8TJ-GD7V].
172. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 585 (2nd ed. 2000).
173. Public Hearing on LD 1092 Before the Joint Standing Committee on
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of
Richard A. Erb, President and CEO Maine Health Care Association)
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=9065
[https://perma.cc/A8NR-FEEK].
174. Id.
175. Financing & Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/
medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/financing-and-reimbursement/financingand-reimbursement.html [https://perma.cc/T6T4-TRU3] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
176. ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 2.
177. Id.
178. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 7;
Page, supra note 21.
179. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 9.
180. Id. at 8–10. If the life settlement company is aware of the pending Medicaid

198

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:177

company willing to purchase her life insurance policy and transfers
ownership to the investor.181 The difference between the Medicaid
settlement through the private option and a normal life settlement
is that, under the state Medicaid settlement legislation, the
proceeds from the settlement go to an irrevocable bank account,
and the funds may only be used for long-term care.182 Following
this transaction, the settlement funds will not disqualify a candidate
for Medicaid.183 Current information available on this legislation
does not state whether the settlement proceeds are taxed as
income.184
C. The Public Option
The public option bypasses the third-party investor.185 Instead,
the state acts as a fiduciary in the life insurance transaction.186
Under this option, the Medicaid applicant irrevocably assigns the
state as the primary beneficiary of her policy.187 In return, the state
takes over paying the premiums and makes periodic payments to
the applicant to reimburse the cost of long-term care.188 Current
state agencies would administer the process.189
The public option is considered a collateral assignment, and
when the insured dies the state is reimbursed for the cost of paying
the Medicaid benefits and premiums.190 Any remaining funds are
paid to the “named beneficiaries of the policy.”191 The Florida
legislation does not address that the insured and the policy owner
need not be the same person, in other words, the owner of the asset
denial, the bargaining power will significantly swing to their favor. See supra Part II.D.
181. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1111A.002 (22) (West 2011).
182. S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal
Impact Statement, at 6, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/0794/Analyses/2013s
0794.cf.PDF [https://perma.cc/ED2X-DFFB].
183. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 10.
Medicaid typically has a “[f]ive-year period prior to a person’s application for Medicaid
payment of long-term care services [where the] agency determines if any transfers of
assets have taken place during that period that would disqualify the applicant from
receiving Medicaid benefits for a period of time called the penalty period.” Glossary,
supra note 164.
184. E.g., Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166.
185. Id. at 9–10.
186. Id. at 10.
187. Id. at 9.
188. Id. at 10.
189. Id. at 9.
190. S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal
Impact Statement, supra note 182 at 7.
191. Id.
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might not be the insured.192
D. The Cost of Medicaid and the Savings of Medicaid Settlements
Medicaid is the third largest government program, having a
budget of $265 billion per year.193 In the next ten years, annual
federal Medicaid funding is expected to reach $554 billion.194 The
states pay an additional $160 billion a year for Medicaid.195 It is
“estimated that 70 percent of Americans who reach the age of 65
will need some kind of long-term care for at least three years
during their lifetime.”196 These long-term care costs, if not
privately funded, are covered by Medicaid even for those over 65
because Medicare does not cover long-term care.197 Long-term
care ranges from a private nursing home room with a national
average annual cost exceeding $90,000 in 2012 to a home health
aide for $21,000 a year.198
Florida studied the cost savings of the proposed Medicaid
settlement legislation through the Center for Economic Forecasting
and Analysis.199 The Center’s report on the financial impact of the
proposed Medicaid settlement legislation in Florida concluded that
“allowing these conversions would benefit elders . . . in Florida who
become self-care limited by approximately $138–157 million (net)
annually.”200 Other states rely on this Florida study to estimate
their own economic savings.201

192. Id.
193. Michael D. Tanner, ObamaCare created a Medicaid time bomb, N.Y. POST,
(Dec. 7, 2013, 9:15 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/12/07/the-medicaid-time-bomb/.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Betty Ann Bowser, Why Long-Term Care for U.S. Seniors is Headed for
‘Crisis’, PBS (Mar. 20, 2013, 11:50 AM) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
americas-looming-long-term-care-crisis-and-what-can-be-done/
[https://perma.cc/HXN3-NUK6].
See also, How Much Care Will You Need?,
LONGTERMCARE.GOV,
http://longtermcare.gov/the-basics/how-much-care-will-youneed/ [https://perma.cc/MR2R-GYGN] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“Someone turning
age 65 today has almost a 70% chance of needing some type of long-term care
services and supports in their remaining years.”).
197. What’s not covered by Part A & Part B?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.
medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/not-covered/item-and-services-not-covered-bypart-a-and-b.html [https://perma.cc/L94H-5NCW](last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
198. ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 2.
199. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 8.
200. Id.
201. Public Hearings on H.R. 3174 Before the Joint Standing Committee on
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of
Senator Margaret Craven) http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc

200

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:177

IV. THE RISK OF MEDICAID SETTLEMENTS
Mandating the insertion of a settlement feature into life
insurance policies could raise the cost of life insurance policies
by an undetermined amount and make life insurance less
affordable, causing an undetermined number of [people] to
forego the purchase of life insurance and leave their families
more financially at risk upon their demise.202

This conclusion by the Louisiana Advisory Work Group is a
grim warning. The rapidly growing life settlement market poses a
significant danger to the life insurance industry,203 and Medicaid
settlement legislation only exacerbates the problem.204 The appeal
of the immediate cost savings can be analogized to a pay-day
loan—immediately richer, but ultimately worse off.
A. The Problem with Life Settlements
Many participants in a life settlement are harmed, from the
insured, to the policy owner, to the original beneficiary, to the
insurance company, to anyone who may purchase life insurance in
the future. To begin with, the insured is harmed. The financial
value of a life limits the insurance available to cover that person.205
When an insured sells her life insurance policy, the policy is still in
force and can reduce or eliminate the amount of personal life
insurance that the insured is eligible to purchase in the future.206
There are also tax implications to life settlements that may
impact policy owners, as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”) warns.207 By selling a policy, the policy
owner forgoes the favorable tax treatment intended for the
product.208 “[P]ublic policy should encourage families to protect
themselves financially from the unexpected loss of a provider,” but
.asp?id=9064 [https://perma.cc/6QND-C8R8].
202. ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 4.
203. As an example, a book of policies with $100,000,000 in face value and a
50% lapse rate is converted through settlements from a $50,000,000 future payout
liability to a 0%zero percent lapse rate and $100,000,000 future payout liability because
death is a certainty, not a risk.
204. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613(l) (West 2015) (requiring the
department to proactively advertise and raise awareness about the life settlement
option); see also ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166,
at 6 (“To supplement private marketing efforts, the legislature could direct education
initiatives by state government.”).
205. Seniors Beware, supra note 3.
206. Id.
207. Id.; What is a Life Settlement?, supra note 18.
208. I.R.C. § 101 (2013).
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this public policy does not extend to the sale of life insurance and
neither do the tax benefits.209 Despite the states’ legislative silence
on the tax treatment of Medicaid settlements, the IRS is explicit
that life settlements do not receive the benefit of the tax treatment
of life insurance.210
Beyond these tax concerns, a life settlement is financially
imprudent for policy owners. An economic study performed by
Deloitte Consulting and the University of Connecticut concluded
that a “policyholder with impaired health could maximize her
estate value if other assets are liquidated and the life insurance
policy is maintained until death.”211 This study was completed
before Medicaid settlement legislation developed, but the principle
remains: the amount received by the policy owner in a life
settlement, 16.2% in 2013,212 is not a good deal, and it is
unconscionable to intimate that losing 83.8%213 of a guaranteed
death benefit is prudent.214
When a permanent policy lapses, the owner is not walking
away empty-handed.215 The policy owner had a period of life
insurance where the death benefit would have been paid if the
insured died, similar to a term policy. However, this person
purchased a permanent policy with the option to retain the policy
beyond a fixed term.216 The fact that it lapsed does not mean the

209. Tax Expenditure of the Week: Tax-Free “Inside Buildup” of Life Insurance,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/opengovernment/news/2011/03/30/9220/tax-expenditure-of-the-week-tax-free-insidebuildup-of-life-insurance [https://perma.cc/D6GG-HREE] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
210. I.R.C. § 101 (2013); Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B.; Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B.
211. DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, supra note 117, at 13.
212. Horowitz, supra note 91, at 4 (dividing the total paid: 362,169,970, by the
total face value: 2,231,933,404, to calculate the percentage of the guaranteed death
benefit that is received).
213. This is not even calculating the tax incurred through the settlement.
214. Seniors Beware, supra note 3 (“Life settlements can have high transaction
costs and unintended consequences. And even if you decide a life settlement is
generally right for you, it can be hard to tell whether you are getting a fair price.”).
215. As long as premiums are paid, with a permanent policy the termination of
the policy is the decision of the policy owner. See generally Life Insurance Basics, INS.
INFO. INST. http://www.iii.org/article/life-insurance-basics [https://perma.cc/S7RH7BH3] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). With a term policy, the termination of coverage is a
term of the contract. Id. Therefore, if a ten year term policy terminated after year ten,
or a policy owner allowed a permanent policy to lapse after year ten, the permanent
policy still had a feature that was not part of the term policy—the right of continuance.
If the insured is diagnosed with cancer in year ten, the permanent policy is much more
valuable in comparison to the term policy. Id.
216. Permanent life insurance remains in force until the insured’s death if all
premiums are paid. Id.
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policy was a waste; the protection was provided and the right to
continue the policy existed.217 The owner purchased a feature,
permanence, at her option, which she did not exercise.218
In addition to the harm and risks to the insured and policy
owner, the original beneficiary loses. In a life settlement, whether
or not part of a Medicaid settlement, the original beneficiary loses
the expected death benefit.219 It was the policy owner’s original
desire for the benefit to go to the named beneficiary. Situations
and relationships change, but especially in the circumstances
surrounding a Medicaid life settlement, the desire to leave a legacy
may not have vanished. Nonetheless, bureaucratic rules on
retained assets mandate the assignment to the state. The desire to
leave a legacy, to leave the next generation better off than the
current, actually harms the intended beneficiaries left behind.220
Insurers also suffer losses in a life settlement. Insurers rely on
many factors when pricing a life insurance policy, including
mortality, persistency, lapse rates,221 expected profits, and the
impact of technology in improving health.222 Insurers experience
economic gains when a life insurance policy lapses because they
have collected premiums on a policy that will not pay a death
benefit.223 This economic gain is used to subsidize remaining in
force policies and price new policies.224 Therefore, if policies that
would otherwise lapse are now sold to investors, the insurer is less
profitable.225
There are now professional investors in a private market and
“[t]he ramifications . . . are enormous to say the least.”226 State
involvement to keep many more policies in force raises the

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. E.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015).
220. While the loss of choice is not a legal harm, there is a notable emotional
benefit to the policy owner (or insured) to have the death benefit go to the beneficiary
of her choosing. See Huslin, supra note 71.
221. Some recognition must be given to the argument that healthy lives lapse
while unhealthy lives persist, or keep their life insurance policy in force. DELOITTE
CONSULTING LLP, supra note 117, at 2. However, this argument fails to recognize that
a life settlement is more often related to the financial condition of the policy owner
than the physical health of the insured. And, even someone with impaired health faces
a better return on her investment by retaining the policy than selling it. Id.
222. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 19.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Page, supra note 21.
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financial obligations of insurance companies in unexpected ways.227
But not all view these ramifications as a problem. Chris Ortesis,
Chief Executive Officer of the life settlement company Life Care
Funding, testified before the Maine Senate Committee on
Insurance and Financial Services that there are “clear winners with
Life Insurance Policy Conversions[.]”228 They are “[t]he policy
owner and their family . . . . [t]he provider of long term care
services . . . . [t]he state of Maine’s Medicaid program and the
taxpayers.”229 When it comes to making large profits, where there
are clear winners there are also clear losers. While the state and
the provider of long-term care services win, not mentioned are the
profits for life settlement companies.230 Unacknowledged losers are
life insurance companies and the policyholders that will be held
accountable to cover the higher payments.231
In the future, the life settlement market may have no winners.
The 2010 Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Task Force
found that “[w]hile life settlements may impact an insurer’s
profitability and financial condition[s] . . . the extent of this impact
is likely to be small.”232 This small impact projection relies on “the
very small percentage” of life insurance policies that have been
sold.233 However, laws must be enacted with the future in mind.
Medicaid settlement legislation has the potential to increase the
size of the life settlement market significantly.234 Although the life
227. Warren S. Hersch, Texas Law Promoting Life Settlements is Bad News,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (June 21, 2013) http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/06/21/texas-lawpromoting-life-settlements-is-bad-news [https://perma.cc/SZ94-JV2J].
228. Public Hearings on L.D. 1092 Before the Joint Standing Committee on
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of Chris
Ortesis, CEO of Life Care Funding) http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/get
TestimonyDoc.asp?id=9066[https://perma.cc/A8NR-FEEK].
229. Id.
230. Id. Mr. Ortesis stated that his company, Life Care Funding, “aims to make
about 10 percent on each purchased policy.” Darren Fishell, Former Insurance
Lobbyist Teaches Seniors How to Avoid Medicaid for End-of-Life Care, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://bangordailynews.com/2014/09/12/
business/former-insurance-lobbyist-educates-seniors-on-how-to-avoid-medicaid-forend-of-life-care/.
231. Public Hearings on L.D. 1092 Before the Joint Standing Committee on
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of Chris
Ortesis, CEO, Life Care Funding) http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/get
TestimonyDoc.asp?id=9066 [https://perma.cc/A8NR-FEEK].
232. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 20.
233. Id.
234. E.g., Texas requires the department to proactively advertise and raise
awareness about the life settlement option. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613(l)
(West 2015) (“The department shall educate applicants for long-term care services . . .
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insurance industry may not suffer in the short term, the future of
the industry is at risk now with the enactment of Medicaid
settlement legislation. These expansions will propel the life
settlement market to a point where it is no longer a “very small
percentage” of the industry.235
Insurance contracts from this point forward will be priced with
Medicaid settlement law in mind.236 The additional expense will be
passed to future policy owners,237 and the cost of life insurance will
increase. This cost will be spread throughout new policy owners,
because insurers will recover costs and have no way to distinguish
those who are purchasing the policy as an investment to sell in a
future market with those who are purchasing the policy to invest in
their family and protect their family for conventional purposes.
With only one product to sell, the first will purchase a policy that is
cheaper than actuarially priced, and the second will be compelled
to cover the difference.
B. The Problem with the Public Option
The public option recommended in Florida238 and enacted in
Kansas and Indiana presents additional unique concerns.239 The
public option is a collateral assignment.240 This means that the state
pays the policy premiums, is assigned the irrevocable beneficiary,
and makes periodic payments to the policy owner to reimburse the
about options for life insurance policies, including options that do not allow a life
insurance policy to be considered as an asset or resource in determining eligibility for
medical assistance.”).
235. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 20.
236. Id. at 13 (“Insurers base their premium rates on certain assumptions,
including assumptions of policy lapse rates.”); DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, supra
note 117, at 12. (“One of the key actuarial assumptions used in pricing a life insurance
contract is the anticipation of lapse rates.”).
237. Future policy owners will bear the additional expense because the cost of
life insurance is determined at time of contract; it is locked in. Why I Purchased Life
Insurance at 23, NEW YORK LIFE, http://www.newyorklife.com/learn-and-plan/whypurchased-life-insurance-at-23 [https://perma.cc/LGK3-54WJ] (last visited Feb. 22,
2016). Some term life insurance has increasing premiums as a product feature (part of
the original policy terms), but these products are not the target of the life settlement
market.
Life Insurance - Top Ten Questions, DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS.
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/consumer/que_top10/que_life.htm
[https://perma.cc/E8AVWN4P] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
238. This bill did not pass in Florida. CS/SB 794: Medicaid Eligibility, FLA.
SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/0794 [https://perma.cc/
795H-9CYY] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
239. IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014);
Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166 at 10.
240. IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014).
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cost of long-term care incurred by the policy owner.241 At an
insured’s death, the state retains the portion of the death benefit
that reimburses the state for the cost of Medicaid and the life
insurance premiums paid.242 Any death benefit beyond that
amount is awarded to the original beneficiary.243
1. Medicaid Settlements are not a Collateral Assignment
First, in this public option arrangement, the state has a
perverse interest in the early death of the assignor.244 If the
assignor outlives the death benefit of her life insurance policy,245
then the state becomes responsible for the extended portion of her
long-term Medicaid care.246 While it is true of Medicaid in general
that the longer a person lives the higher the expense for the state,
this relationship removes any notion of an insurable interest—any
interest in the “continued life” of the assignor247—for the assignee,
the state.248
Second, by labeling the settlement a loan,249 the state has
statutorily created an insurable interest that is contrary to the long-

241. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 9–10.
242. IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014). It is
not clear whether the state recoups all the long-term costs, or only the costs financed by
the state (as opposed to the federal contribution).
243. IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014).
244. While this is true for the Medicaid program in general, it is not a
characteristic of traditional collateral assignments. See In re Taslis, 41 B.R. 47, 49
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (“Generally, a collateral assignment of an interest in property is
a secured transaction whereby a borrower assigns his interest in property to a lender to
secure performance of an obligation. The assignee for security (the secured party) has
the right to collect the assigned claim and apply the proceeds in satisfaction of the
secured debt; any surplus belongs to the assignor (the borrower).” (citations omitted)).
245. The death benefit has been pre-spent via assignment to the state.
Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166 at 10. “The state
acts as a fiduciary intermediary converting assets held in a life insurance contract to
periodic payments offsetting the cost of long-term care confinement.” Id.
246. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631(2) (West 2014) (“Medicaid . . . shall begin
on the day following exhaustion of the life settlement proceeds . . . .”).
247. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).
248. Medicaid, and the elderly in general, carry financial burdens for the state
outside the Medicaid settlement legislation. See supra Part III.D. However, the scope
of this argument is limited to say that the state has no insurable interest in the life of
the insured (who may, or may not be the Medicaid recipient). See generally Conn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460. Without this insurable interest, it is inaccurate to
classify the relationship established in a Medicaid settlement as a collateral assignment.
Id. Without insurable interest, the relationship established by a Medicaid settlement
falls within the boundaries of the proposal of this Note. See infra Part V.
249. Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659, 662 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A] collateral
assignment transfers only those rights necessary to secure the assignor’s debt.”).

206

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:177

held definition by the Supreme Court.250 As a loan, the state
creates an artificial insurable interest by establishing a debtorcreditor relationship with the Medicaid recipient.251 However,
Medicaid is a government program that is funded through taxes.252
Third, in a collateral assignment, the indebtedness to the
creditor shrinks with each payment. However, with Medicaid
settlements, the debt to the assignor increases daily.253 This is the
opposite of a collateral assignment, and should not be erroneously
labeled as such, because to do so implies that the state has an
insurable interest that simply is not present.
Without insurable interest, there is no collateral assignment
and the assignment is therefore subject to the distinction set forth
in this Note’s proposal. Medicaid settlements should only be
available to life insurance policy owners who choose to purchase
the specific endorsement proposed in this Note.
2. Taxpayers with a Life Insurance Policy are Paying for
Medicaid Twice
A taxpayer who also has a life insurance policy that is assigned
to the state pays twice for the long-term care: once through taxes,254
and once through insurance premiums. In this program the
taxpayer is penalized for purchasing life insurance, even though the
Supreme Court and the IRS have both recognized and preserved
the classic form of life insurance.255
250. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460 (stating that an insurable interest is
a benefit from the “continued life of another”).
251. Id. (“It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life . . .
and the creditor in the life of his debtor.”).
252. Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 175. States must recoup some of
the costs of Medicaid through the Medicaid Estate Recovery Program. 42 U.S.C. §
1396p (2015). However, the total recovered is miniscule, 0.13% of the total amount
spent on Medicaid in 2005. Medicaid Estate Recovery Program, FACTCHECK.ORG,
http://www.factcheck.org/2014/01/medicaid-estate-recovery-program/
[https://perma.cc/Q5G5-3WG5]. “Given the small amounts recovered compared to
total Medicaid spending, it is reasonable to surmise that Medicaid estate recovery is a
relatively infrequent occurrence.” U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Medicaid
Estate Recovery Collections, ASPE, https://aspe.hhs.gov/legacy-page/medicaid-estaterecovery-collections-143701 [https://perma.cc/T9JE-CRRE] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
253. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 3.
“Upon the death of the Medicaid recipient, the state would recoup its costs of
providing Medicaid benefits and . . . paying premium from the death benefit.”
ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 4.
254. Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 175.
255. I.R.C. § 101 (2013); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460 (“[I]n life
insurance the loss can seldom be measured by pecuniary values. Still, an interest of
some sort in the insured life must exist.”).
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Thus there results a significant detrimental impact to a policy
owner for purchasing life insurance early; she is essentially
voluntarily paying for long-term care at an earlier point in her life.
This creates an incentive to not purchase life insurance. For a
candidate with a life insurance policy, Medicaid is a loan program.
For everyone else, it is government provided assistance. This
discrepancy may be justifiable, but, in the very least, must be
acknowledged.
C. Unanswered Questions
In large part because these laws are new, and in many states
not yet passed, many questions linger about the programs.
1. How is the Life Settlement Payout Taxed?
A life settlement executed outside the scope of Medicaid
settlement legislation is taxed as income under the Internal
Revenue Code.256 Under the private option, it is unclear whether
the settlement is taxed in the same way. The settlement is
performed in the exact manner as a non-Medicaid life settlement.257
The only difference is that the funds are held irrevocably in a statecontrolled bank account, and not considered an asset for Medicaid
qualification purposes.258
If the settlement proceeds are taxed as income, the Medicaid
applicant must be warned. A person applying to Medicaid is not in
the financial position to handle a substantial tax bill.259 If the
settlement proceeds are not taxed, then by foregoing the tax, the
federal government is endorsing the legislation.260 In addition, if
not taxed, then the states are acting contrary to the two Revenue
Rulings in 2009 which unquestionably removed the favorable tax
treatment of life settlements intended for the conventional life

256. Id.
257 . See Seniors Beware, supra note 3.
258. S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal
Impact Statement, supra note 182.
259. Most states limit countable assets to $2,000. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Services, Financial Requirements - Assets, LONGTERMCARE.GOV, http://
longtermcare.gov/medicare-medicaid-more/medicaid/medicaid-eligibility/financialrequirements-assets (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
260. This is comparable to municipal bonds that do not pay a federal tax, by not
collecting the tax the federal government is considered to be providing a form of
“federal aid.” The Tax Break-Down: Municipal Bonds, THE COMMITTEE FOR A
RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET (Sept. 13, 2013), http://crfb.org/blogs/tax-breakdown-municipal-bonds [https://perma.cc/84K4-8SAW].
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insurance market.261 Either way, the tax implications to the
legislation must be clarified.
2. What Rate is Charged to Life Settlement Funds for LongTerm Care?
The government pays a lower rate to long-term care providers
under Medicaid than private payers.262 Under the public option,
where Medicaid candidates are reimbursed for their long-term care
expenses,263 are these candidates paying the private rate, or the
government rate? If it is the government rate, then this legislation
further discourages the use of private long-term care insurance, or
adding a long-term care rider to a life insurance policy because
neither of these two private remedies allow the lower, government
rate. If they pay the private rate, then life insurance companies are
legislatively forced to fund Medicaid at a rate even higher than the
government’s funding of its own program.
3. Does this Legislation Apply to Existing Contracts?
Texas Medicaid settlement law does not specify whether the
legislation applies to life insurance policies issued prior to the June
14, 2013 enactment.264 The law states that the new law applies to
Medicaid eligibility determinations made after January 1, 2014, and
any determination before that date is governed by the former
law.265 In the Louisiana study, the work group found that
“[i]nsurance companies reserves are based on the exposure created
by their existing contract language. Statutorily imposing language
or conditions that alter existing contracts will affect insurer
solvency.”266 This conclusion reiterates that this Louisiana proposal
only impacts “new life insurance policies containing [the Medicaid
settlement] benefit.”267 The law protects the “settled expectations”
of a party, and the insurer had no reason to anticipate this
additional financial burden.268
261. Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B.; Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B.; see supra, Part II.D.4.
262. Kevin D. Dayaratna, Studies Show: Medicaid Patients Have Worse Access
and Outcomes than the Private Insured, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, (Nov. 9, 2012),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2740.pdf. (“Medicaid typically pays
physicians 56 percent of the amount that private insurers pay.”).
263. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 10.
264. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015).
265. Id.
266. ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 4.
267. Id. at 7.
268. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“Elementary
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To apply this law to in force life insurance policies violates the
United States Constitution. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”269 These laws will impair
the solvency of life insurance companies to meet the obligations of
in force contracts, the ability to pay all death claims as promised.
The law must respect the Constitution and the “[e]lementary
considerations of fairness.”270
4. What if a Medicaid Applicant is the Policy Owner but not
the Insured?
Often, the policy owner and the insured are not the same
person. For example, a grandparent may purchase life insurance
on a grandchild.271 If this grandparent applies for Medicaid and
collaterally assigns the policy to the state, the asset, the life
insurance policy, will not—hopefully—reimburse the state for the
Medicaid loan for a very long time. This is a major oversight in the
law.272
This mistake leads to further questions about whether the
economic savings of this program are correct. In the public option,
the state is ignoring a pivotal step in determining the profitability of
the transaction: the life expectancy of the insured.273 Is the state
truly willing to take on all risk, or should it be as selective as the
rest of the secondary market? States supporting the public option
fail to address these underwriting concerns.274
5.

Is Medicaid Settlement Legislation Really the Answer?

Louisiana revisited the proposed legislation, and the Louisiana
Department of Insurance (“LDI”) updated the 2013 study.275
Between April 1, 2012, and March 31, 2013, the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”) received
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know
what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should
not be lightly disrupted.”).
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
270. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265.
271. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:901C (2012) (With “individuals related
closely by blood or by law, a substantial interest [is] engendered by love and
affection.”).
272. S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal
Impact Statement, supra note 182.
273. See Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166.
274. See id.
275. See LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171, at 4; see generally ADVISORY WORK
GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 1.
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approximately 12,000 applications for Medicaid, of which 423 were
denied.276 However, of these 423 only eighty owned life insurance
policies, and only twenty-two were denied Medicaid coverage
based on the life insurance.277 Only two of the twenty-two life
insurance policies valued in excess of $50,000.278
Two states, Kansas and Indiana, have enacted the public
option.279 Since 2012, only one person in Kansas has used the
option, assigning the benefits of a life insurance policy to the
state.280 This is attributed to the legislation being unknown, and not
desired.281 Indiana passed the legislation in 2011, but has yet to
implement the public option.282 Florida determined that Medicaid
settlement legislation would save Florida “approximately $138–157
million (net) annually.”283 It is to be seen whether this will cure the
Medicaid financial crises, or whether the cost-saving projections are
inflated. Six states failed to pass similar Medicaid settlement bills
in 2014. 284
There are additional concerns with how Medicaid settlement
legislation complies with federal Medicaid law. For example, the
Indiana statute limits the assignment, stating that “[t]he office may
receive funds under this subsection only to the extent permitted by
42 U.S.C. § 1396p.”285 Federal Medicaid law limits what may be
recovered following the death of a Medicaid recipient.286 A state
must obtain “federal waivers or authorizations for [a] state-based
variation on Medicaid eligibility requirements” which are set by the
federal government.287 The compatibility of this state legislation
and federal Medicaid law is unknown.288
276. Id.
277. Id. at 2 (“[V]iatical brokers purchase only policies with face value of $50,000
or more.”).
278. Id. at 1.
279. Id. at 2.
280. LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171.
281. Id. at 1.
282. Id. at 2.
283. Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 8.
284. California, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Massachusetts has decided to perform a study on the proposal. LA. DEP’T OF INS.,
supra note 171, at 3.
285. IND. CODE § 12-15-2-17(d)(2015).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2013).
Kentucky also “acknowledges that
implementation may be limited by federal law.” LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171, at
2.
287. LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171, at 3.
288. Even with the federal authority to deny the variation (thus, effectively
prohibit state Medicaid settlements), the proposal of this Note is still needed. The
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D. The Conflict of Interest
States must always perform a regulatory balancing act. But
now as a market participant, states face a dangerous conflict of
interest. A state must protect the people of the state, reduce its
own deficit, and keep insurers solvent so that death claims are paid
as promised.289 These are competing interests, as demonstrated by
existing and proposed Medicaid settlement legislation.
While advocates of Medicaid settlement legislation argue that
this is a consumer first approach, on more careful examination, it is
not. Instead, this is a Medicaid-funding approach that first and
foremost provides revenue to the state, with state consumer’s
interests pushed to the background.290 If the primary motivation
behind this legislation is to protect consumers, states should pass
legislation that considers a life insurance policy a protected asset
that does not restrict eligibility for Medicaid, similar to a primary
home or motor vehicle.291 While there is concern for access to the
cash build up in some life insurance products, legislation to restrict
access to these funds (which is common in divorce situations) is
available.292
States are empowered to amend their current
Medicaid qualifications to treat life insurance in a more favorable
way.293
In addition to ways that state governments could
simultaneously protect life insurance policies and long-term care,
the life insurance industry provides its own options. Some insurers

proposal set forth infra creates a market-based solution to the issue that one (the
current) market for life insurance is asked to inefficiently handle two distinguishable
economic uses of life insurance. Further, unilateral refusal to allow states to pass
Medicaid legislation would, in effect, legislatively abolish a new segment of the
secondary market for life insurance, whereas this Note’s proposal would allow the new
segment but price it according to policy features.
289. The United States Insurance Financial Solvency Framework, NAIC (2010)
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_us_solvency_framework.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RE9Q-GCFJ].
290. See Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at
8.
291. U.S. Dep’t of Human & Human Services, supra note 259.
292. In a divorce, a court may issue a Qualified Domestic Relations Order that
removes some rights of a life insurance policy owner. E.g., Lessard v. Lessard, No.
FA97–0343326S, 1998 WL 525533, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1998) (“Husband
shall name the Wife beneficiary on $150,000 of life insurance insuring his life until he
no longer has any financial responsibility to her for the payment of alimony. The
Husband shall also name each minor child beneficiary on $50,000 of life insurance
insuring his life.”).
293. States determine financial eligibility for Medicaid. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Services, supra note 259.
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offer life insurance with a long-term care rider, or accelerated
death benefit rider.294
These riders come at an additional
premium295 and with unique features, but generally allow for a part
of the death benefit to be used for long-term care if needed.296
V. THE PROPOSAL: A FEDERAL RESPONSE
As demonstrated by this Note up to this point, the states have
now entered the life insurance market in a way that is in direct
contradiction to the purpose of life insurance as held by the
Supreme Court.297

A. The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 Authorizes Federal
Intervention
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, a federal statute
preempts a state statute regarding the “business of insurance”
when the federal statute is deliberate in the regulation of the
insurance industry.298 The McCarran-Ferguson Act is restricted to
an Act of Congress which “shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede” any state law that regulates the business of
insurance.299 The Act sanctioned the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)300 and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act301 among others. It must now
address the secondary market of life insurance.
294. Elizabeth O’Brien, Hedging your bets on long-term care, MARKETWATCH
(Nov. 6, 2013, 6:15 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedging-your-bets-onlong-term-care-2013-11-06. See supra Part II.D.4.
295. The additional cost of the long-term care rider serves as further proof that
current life insurance policies, or policies without this endorsement, are not priced to
accommodate Medicaid settlements. See, e.g., Life Insurance with Additional Care
Benefit, Northwestern Mutual, https://www.northwesternmutual.com/products-andservices/life-insurance/state/accelerated-care-benefits-state [https://perma.cc/SS6GWVXS] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
296. O’Brien, supra note 294.
297. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876) (stating that
the “real purpose” of the life insurance policy must not be a wager, “but to secure such
advantages, supposed to depend on the life of another . . . to prevent . . . a mere
wager”); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 780 (1881) (The law is “opposed” to policy
owners having an “interest[] in the death rather than the life of the party assured.”).
298. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2014).
299. Id.
300. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat 1936 (1996).
301. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
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B. Proposed Federal Intervention: Turn Insurable Interest into a
Negotiable Term of a Life Insurance Contract
The federal government should exercise its power under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to permit life insurance companies to
offer and negotiate an insurable interest requirement that applies
subsequent to contract formation as a contract term, and for the
entire duration of the contract, and to price such policies
accordingly. This federal statute would allow a life insurance
purchaser the freedom to pay for the features of the policy that she
values without the obligation to subsidize more. In essence, the
current life insurance market should be allowed to offer two
options: a life insurance product that is only assignable with
insurable interest, and a life insurance product equivalent to
today’s products that are freely assignable. The premiums would
correlate with the contract terms, with the free assignability option
being more expensive.
The scope of this proposal must be federal as it must be
uniform across states that currently have divergent assignability
laws. Most states currently enforce assignment of a life insurance
policy to the extent that the terms of the contract allow.302 This
also means that these states would presently enforce a nonassignability clause in a policy. However, ten states—California,
Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
North Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin—expressly prohibit an insurer
from restricting assignment of a life insurance policy.303 With
profitable Medicaid settlement legislation spreading throughout
the states, there is little motivation for these states to now give life
insurance companies more contracting power.304
In addition to these ten states, three more have conflicts within
their own statutes. Kentucky allows the assignment of a life
insurance policy “as provided by [the] terms of the contract,”305 but
also prohibits insurers from “restrict[ing], limit[ing], or impair[ing]
in any way the lawful transfer of ownership, change of beneficiary,

302 . E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 119A (2014).
303. CAL. INS. CODE § 10130 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a–465 (2014);
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 16-111 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2207 (2014);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.200 (2015); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3212 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-33 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. §
31A-22-412 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. § 632.47 (2014).
304. See Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at
8.
305. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-250(1) (West 2014).
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or assignment of a policy.”306 Maine307 and Washington308 have
similar conflicts.
These thirteen states pose a problem for insurers wishing to
issue state specific life insurance policies in permissive states having
non-assignment clauses. With the mobility of policy owners, a life
insurance policy that is issued in a state that enforces a nonassignability clause may subsequently “relocate” with its owner to a
restrictive state, resulting in an unenforceable contract clause at the
time of assignment.309 Therefore, with these conflicts of laws, a
prudent insurer contracts considering the most restrictive states, in
this case with free assignability (with resultant higher premiums)
mandated by these thirteen states.
Without a contract term restricting policy assignment, courts
rely on state law to determine the validity of the assignment. With
most states requiring insurable interest for the first two or five
years of a policy, after this time period the lack of restriction is
interpreted as acceptance of free assignability by the insurer.310
Therefore, without the proposed federal intervention, these state
laws on insurable interest impliedly restrict life insurers to provide
multiple insurance policies through unique contract terms
regarding their assignability.
As an example, in Grigsby a contract clause stated any claim
to the policy was “subject to proof on interest.”311 The Court
determined that without a rule of law supporting the contract term,
it was unenforceable and “[did] not diminish the rights” of the
third-party purchaser.312
As such, absent collective state
306. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-717(1)(p)(3) (West 2014).
307. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24-A, § 2420 (2014). But see ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. TIT. 24-A, § 6812-A (2009).
308. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.360 (2014). But see WASH. REV. CODE §
48.102.130 (2014).
309. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (holding that an
insurance policy purchased by an Illinois resident and citizen in Illinois who later
moved to Florida and became a resident and citizen of Florida was governed by Florida
law); see also Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954)
(allowing suit in Louisiana under Louisiana law for an insurance policy that was
negotiated for and issued in Massachusetts, delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois,
even though under Louisiana law one of the contract clauses was unenforceable).
310. Cf. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96, 102 (1920) (interpreting a
two-year suicide exclusion in a life insurance policy as an “inverted expression” that
after that time, it is not a defense).
311. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 157 (1911).
312. Id. (“[A] ‘claim against the company, arising under any assignment of the
policy, shall be subject to proof on interest.’ But [with] no rule of law to that effect, and
the company saw fit to pay, the clause did not diminish the rights of Grigsby, as against
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cooperation, this proposal requires a federal law.
C.

Grigsby v. Russell not at Conflict

Grigsby v. Russell, the 1911 decision that is consistently
recognized as providing Supreme Court acquiescence to the life
settlement market,313 is not in conflict with this proposal. In
Grigsby, the Supreme Court held that there need not be an
inherent insurable interest requirement in the transfer of
ownership after the life insurance policy is purchased.314 Therefore,
under the terms of Mr. Burchard’s contract,315 without a challenge
by the insurance company, and with “no rule of law” requiring
insurable interest, the Court permitted the assignment.316
Under this construct, Grigsby does not contradict a federal
mandate that insurable interest at assignment be a negotiable term
of the life insurance contract. This proposal creates a law
consistent with Grigsby, and therefore contracts that include the
term would be enforceable under Grigsby. According to Grigsby,
contracts that exclude the insurable interest at assignment term still
lack an inherent insurable interest requirement at inception, and
would still be freely assignable.317
With this proposal, Grisby remains the authority for the life
settlement market.318 While the Court found no inherent insurable
interest requirement in the Grigsby contract,319 this proposal will
allow for an explicit contract term, fully consistent with Grigsby.
This federally sanctioned freedom of contract would give
purchasers of life insurance the ability to purchase exactly the
features of life insurance which they value, without an unwanted
mandate to purchase the equivalent of a compulsory assignability
the administrators of Burchard’s estate.”). Id.
313. See Life Settlement Questions, supra note 53; see also History of Life
Settlements in the U.S., supra note 53.
314. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911).
315. Id. Mr. Burchard was the original policy owner and insured, who sold the
life insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby. Id.
316. Id. at 157.
317. Id.
318. Id. The language in this Supreme Court decision suggests that the Court did
not anticipate the reach of this case. See id. The Court saw the facts before it as “a
very different . . . thing from granting such a general license, to allow [Mr. Burchard] to
transfer it to one whom he, the party most concerned, is not afraid to trust.” Id. at 155.
These facts were very different from the “mischievous kind of gaming” objectionable
since early English cases. Id. at 156. This language by the Court implies a limitation
that falls short of today’s life settlement market. See id.
319. Id. at 157.
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endorsement.
D. Concerns with the Proposal
The Supreme Court recognized in Grigsby v. Russell that life
insurance has long been characterized as property, “[s]o far as
reasonable safety permits.”320 Indeed, viewing a life insurance
policy as an asset is what causes an issue for Medicaid
qualification.321 The Grigsby Court found that “[t]o deny the right
to sell except to persons [with insurable interest would] diminish
appreciably the value of the contract . . . .”322 This remains true: the
value of a life insurance policy will vary based on the contract
terms, specifically the free assignability of the policy. However, the
premium will correlate to the value of the policy, removing the risk
of harm to the owner that the Court feared.323 With the freedom to
purchase either a fully liquid policy or one that is only transferrable
to one with an insurable interest, the property rights are part of the
initial contract, allowing contract negotiation in good faith with
supporting commensurate pricing.
Additionally, the states’ responses to STOLI, most requiring
two or five year waiting periods before the sale of a policy absent
an insurable interest, show that these property rights are not
guaranteed. States are willing to delay assignability of all life
insurance policies in a protective effort that delays property
rights.324 Contracting property rights at the outset of the policy
purchase is not an injustice.
Further, the global life settlement market shows that there is
not a universal right to sell a life insurance policy as property.325
This, along with the life insurance products in the US market, is
why the policies involved in the “world” market are in fact US
policies, with foreigners gambling on the lives of Americans.326 As

320 . Id.
321. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, supra note 259.
322. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156.
323. Id. The risk of harm is the “diminish[ed] value” of the policy. Id.
324. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 223A (2014). Massachusetts requires
a two-year waiting period. Therefore, for the first two years following the purchase of
life insurance in Massachusetts, the property rights of that policy are diminished. Id.
325. Ontario, Canada is one example of a place where it is illegal to sell a life
insurance policy. Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 115 (Can.) (“Any person . . . who
trafficks or trades in life insurance policies for the purpose of procuring the sale,
surrender, transfer, assignment, pledge or hypothecation thereof to himself, herself or
itself or any other person, is guilty of an offence.”).
326. The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, supra note 143.
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the life settlement market develops, there is a potential concern
that foreigners have a financial interest in the early demise of US
insureds.327
Finally, the risk to the life insurance industry and the viability
of insurers to remain solvent within the existing and proposed life
settlement practices makes it the duty of the federal government
and states to protect this very asset, otherwise the reasonable safety
of these assets will be jeopardized.328 Additionally, this proposal is
narrow and only regulates the insurable interest requirement, while
leaving the states free to continue to regulate the life insurance
industry.
E. The True Cost: the Risk of Status Quo
Life insurance is not only for the wealthy.329 It is meant as a
feasible option for those who want to protect their loved ones and
make death a simple mourning process without a simultaneous
devastating financial collapse.330 It is in society’s best interest to
encourage private life insurance and to reward those who
financially protect their family.331 The harm to the life insurance
industry will not manifest itself immediately; it has too much
momentum for immediate impact.332 But inevitably the life
327. This is admittedly conspiratorial, but nonetheless worth mentioning.
328. See, e.g. 31 U.S.C. § 313 (2013) (The Federal Insurance Office “monitor[s]
all aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the
regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry
or the United States financial system.”); Massachusetts Division of Insurance,
MASS.GOV,
http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/government/oca-agencies/doi-lp/mass-div-ofinsurance.html [https://perma.cc/7ECK-8YA6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“The DOI
monitors financial solvency [of] insurance companies.”).
329. When Should You Buy Life Insurance?, KIPLINGER, (Jan. 2015),
http://www.kiplinger.com/article/insurance/T034-C000-S001-when-should-you-buy.html
[https://perma.cc/3HTN-HKRA] (explaining that single income families with children,
single parents, and those caring for elderly parents are all high-need situations for life
insurance).
330. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 540 (1941) (“[U]sually insurance
payable to specific beneficiaries is designed to shift . . . the risk of premature death of
the one upon whom the beneficiaries are dependent for support. Indeed, the . . .
protection of contracts and their proceeds intended to guard against just such a risk.”);
see also Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876) (stating that the
“real purpose” of the life insurance policy must not be a wager, “but to secure such
advantages, supposed to depend on the life of another . . . to prevent . . . a mere
wager”).
331. Helvering, 312 U.S. at 539.
332. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 20. The life insurance
industry is so large that a small life settlement market has a negligible impact, but an
impact will be felt as it grows. Id. (“Industry observers have predicted that life
settlements will have an insignificant impact on the insurance industry . . . given the
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settlement market will reach the size where it irreparably harms the
industry. While the current concerns with how to fix and fund
Medicaid seem insurmountable, these fears pale in comparison to
the gradual destruction of the life insurance industry.333 Medicaid is
funded through taxes;334 insurance companies paid $18.1 billion in
taxes in 2014.335 The industry has $3.6 trillion of invested assets,
and over 2.5 million employees.336 The size of the industry does not
make it too big to fail; the size makes it too big to arbitrarily risk, a
dangerous status quo.
CONCLUSION
A prescient Supreme Court in Warnock viewed the
assignment of a life insurance policy after its commencement as
“contrary to the general policy of the law respecting insurance, in
that it might lead to gambling or speculative contracts upon the
chances of human life.”337 Almost 135 years later, it seems the
Court’s concerns were well warranted as the free assignability of
life insurance policies has single-handedly created an entire, rapidly
growing settlement industry in which both private and public
players gamble—on aggregate, billions of dollars—on the life spans
of total strangers.
Wager policies are “independently of any statute on the
subject, condemned, as being against public policy.”338 They have
been condemned, and any conflicting statute diverges from the
long-standing principles of this country, and others.339 A life
settlement transaction is, in every sense of the word, a wager.340
With free assignability, a life insurance policy can become a wager
policy after purchase. While the intent of the original purchaser
very small percentage of in-force policies that have been settled.”).
333. The Financial Services Industry in the United States, SELECTUSA,
http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/financial-services-industry-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/4UY3-SQEF] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“In 2014, finance and
insurance represented 7.92 percent (or $1.26 trillion) of U.S. gross domestic product.”).
334. Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 175.
335. Insurance Industry at a Glance, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/industry-overview (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
336. Id.
337. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 780 (1881).
338 . Id. at 779.
339. Id.; Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (“That life insurance is
desirable from an economic and social standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk
of loss from premature death is unquestionable.”).
340. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 780 (A wager is when the owner “is interested in the
death rather than the life of the party assured.”).
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was genuine, the investor purchasing the existing insurance at a
later date is purchasing a policy in the same way as an original
owner; there is nothing substantial to differentiate the original
purchase from the subsequent purchase as pertaining to the
definition of a wager—a financial gain at the death of a stranger.
Therefore, to require a good faith intent at the first purchase, but
not the second is contrary to the condemnation of wager policies
dating back to the Life Assurance Act of 1774.341
The life settlement market should not have life insurance
premiums, payments, and resulting payouts and profits subsidized
by policies purchased and retained for genuine insurance purposes.
In an effort to preserve the financial viability of the personal life
insurance industry, Congress should allow insurers to offer and
negotiate an insurable interest requirement subsequent to contract
formation and at the time of assignment as a contract term, and
should price such policies accordingly. Life insurance companies
undertake the risk of others every day. Every policy sold is more
financial exposure to the insurer. Insurers take on the unknown of
one and spread it among many. With the many variables and risks
for which an insurer must account, the life settlement market is
beyond a reasonable scope of future contingencies. The solvency
of life insurance companies hinges on pricing risk, and with the
combination of two separate and unique markets—life insurance
for protection, and life insurance as an investment tool—insurers
will be forced to raise the premiums on the former in order to
subsidize the risk of the latter. The victims bearing the economic
cost of wagers in the market are not the insurance companies, but
ultimately policy owners.
The Robin Hood342 appeal to Medicaid settlement legislation
is tempting, but to steal from the rich—the insurance companies—
to provide for the poor—Medicaid—is to gamble with the entire
US life insurance industry. The Robin Hood fantasy must remain
in English folklore. Laws as dangerous as Medicaid settlements,
and an industry as important as insurance, calls for the hue and cry,
so let it be heard.
341.
342.

Life Assurance Act, 14 Geo. 3 c. 48 (U.K.).
Robin Hood, Who Was Robin Hood, NOTTINGHAM CASTLE MUSEUM AND
ART
GALLERY,
http://www.nottinghamcastle.org.uk/explore/robin-hood
[https://perma.cc/E8YW-9J6T] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“Robin Hood . . . is a heroic
outlaw in English folklore, a highly skilled archer and swordsman. He has become
known for ‘robbing from the rich and giving to the poor’, [sic] assisted by a group of
outlaws known as his ‘Merry Men’ [sic]. The origin of the legend is claimed by some to
have stemmed from actual outlaws, but some say it is only from ballad and story.”).
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